U.S.
GOVERNMENT > The
Three Branches > Judicial Branch > Department
of Commerce v. United States House (1998-1999)
Department
of Commerce v. United States House (98-404)
Syllabus
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
525 U.S. 326
Department of Commerce v. United States House
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
98-404 Argued: November 30,
1998 --- Decided: January 25, 1999 [*]
The Constitution’s Census Clause authorizes
Congress to direct an “actual Enumeration” of
the American public every 10 years to provide
a basis for apportioning congressional representation
among the States. Pursuant to this authority,
Congress has enacted the Census Act (Act),
13 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., delegating
the authority to conduct the decennial census
to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary).
The Census Bureau (Bureau), which is part
of the Department of Commerce, announced
a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling
in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a
chronic and apparently growing problem of “undercounting” of
some identifiable groups, including certain
minorities, children, and renters. In early
1998, two sets of plaintiffs filed separate
suits challenging the legality and constitutionality
of the plan. The suit in No. 98-564 was filed
in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia by four counties and residents
of 13 States. The suit in No. 98-404 was
filed by the United States House of Representatives
in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. Each of the courts held that the
plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for
Article III standing, ruled that the Bureau’s
plan for the 2000 census violated the Census
Act, granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment, and permanently enjoined
the planned use of statistical sampling to
determine the population for congressional
apportionment purposes. On direct appeal,
this Court consolidated the cases for oral
argument.
Held:
1. Appellees in No. 98-564 satisfy
the requirements of Article III standing.
In order to establish such standing, a plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. E.g., Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751. A plaintiff must establish
that there exists no genuine issue of material
fact as to justiciability or the merits in
order to prevail on a summary judgment motion.
See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871, 884. The present controversy
is justiciable because several of the appellees
have met their burden of proof regarding
their standing to bring this suit. In support
of their summary judgment motion, appellees
submitted an affidavit that demonstrates
that it is a virtual certainty that Indiana,
where appellee Hofmeister resides, will lose
a House seat under the proposed census 2000
plan. That loss undoubtedly satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement for standing,
since Indiana residents’ votes will
be diluted by the loss of a Representative.
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208.
Hofmeister also meets the second and third
standing requirements: There is undoubtedly
a “traceable” connection between
the use of sampling in the decennial census
and Indiana’s expected loss of a Representative,
and there is a substantial likelihood that
the requested relief–a permanent injunction
against the proposed uses of sampling in
the census–will redress the alleged
injury. Appellees have also established standing
on the basis of the expected effects of the
use of sampling in the 2000 census on intrastate
redistricting. Appellees have demonstrated
that voters in nine counties, including several
of the appellees, are substantially likely
to suffer intrastate vote dilution as a result
of the Bureau’s plan. Several of the
States in which the counties are located
require use of federal decennial census population
numbers for their state legislative redistricting,
and States use the population numbers generated
by the federal decennial census for federal
congressional redistricting. Appellees living
in the nine counties therefore have a strong
claim that they will be injured because their
votes will be diluted vis-à-vis
residents of counties with larger undercount
rates.
The expected intrastate vote dilution satisfies
the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility
requirements. Pp. 10-16.
2. The Census Act prohibits the proposed
uses of statistical sampling to determine
the population for congressional apportionment
purposes. In 1976, the provisions here at
issue took their present form. Congress revised
13 U.S.C. § 141(a), which authorizes
the Secretary to “take a decennial
census … in such form and content as
he may determine, including the use of sampling
procedures.” This broad grant of authority
is informed, however, by the narrower and
more specific §195. See Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524. As
amended in 1976, §195 provides: “Except
for the determination of population for purposes
of [congressional] apportionment … ,
the Secretary shall, if he considers it feasible,
authorize the use of … statistical … ‘sampling’ in
carrying out the provisions of this title.” Section
195 requires the Secretary to use sampling
in assembling the myriad demographic data
that are collected in connection with the
decennial census, but it maintains the longstanding
prohibition on the use of such sampling in
calculating the population for congressional
apportionment. Absent any historical context,
the “except/shall” sentence structure
in the amended §195 might reasonably
be read as either permissive or prohibitive.
However, the section’s interpretation
depends primarily on the broader context
in which that structure appears. Here,
that context is provided by over 200
years during
which federal census statutes have uniformly
prohibited using statistical sampling
for congressional apportionment. The
Executive
Branch accepted, and even advocated,
this interpretation of the Act until
1994. Pp.
16-25.
3. Because the Court concludes that
the Census Act prohibits the proposed uses
of statistical sampling in calculating the
population for purposes of apportionment,
the Court need not reach the constitutional
question presented. See, e.g., Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,
105. The Court’s affirmance of
the judgment in No. 98-564 also resolves
the
substantive issues presented in No. 98-404,
therefore that case no longer presents
a substantial federal question and the
appeal
therein is dismissed. Cf. Sanks v. Georgia,
401 U.S. 144, 145. P. 26.
No. 98-404, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, appeal
dismissed; No. 98-564, 19 F. Supp.
2d 543, affirmed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-A,
and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, the opinion
of the Court with respect to Part II, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion
with respect to Part III-B, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part,
in which Thomas, J., joined, and in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, J.,
joined as to Part II. Breyer, J., filed
an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting
opinion,
in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined
as to Parts I and II, and in which Breyer,
J., joined as to Parts II and III. Ginsburg,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Souter, J., joined.
